Como os defensores da globalização cederam o campo a Donald Trump

(Por Robert Kuttner, in A Viagem dos Argonautas, 12/09/2019)

Quando se trata de compreender a dinâmica da globalização e a reação contra ela, a descrição mediática das guerras tarifárias de Donald Trump mostra que a visão dominante neoliberal sobre o comércio internacional é tão louca à sua maneira quanto Donald Trump é – e em que Trump é o beneficiário da sua miopia. Deixem-me explicar….


Continuar a ler aqui: A responsabilidade da esquerda na trajetória de ascensão do neoliberalismo – algumas grelhas de leitura – 3. A leitura de Robert Kuttner – B. Como os defensores da globalização cederam o campo a Donald Trump | A Viagem dos Argonautas

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2 pensamentos sobre “Como os defensores da globalização cederam o campo a Donald Trump

  1. « This neo-liberal establishment would have us believe that, during its miracle years between the 1960s and the 1980s, Korea pursued a neo-liberal economic development strategy …

    The reality, however, was very different indeed. What Korea actually did during these decades was to nurture certain new industries, selected by the government in consultation with the private sector, through tariff protection, subsidies and other forms of government support (e.g., overseas marketing information services provided by the state export agency) until they ‘grew up’ enough to withstand international competition. The government owned all the banks, so it could direct the life blood of business—credit …

    The Korean government also had absolute control over scarce foreign ex- change (violation of foreign exchange controls could be punished with the death penalty). When combined with a carefully designed list of priorities in the use of foreign exchange, it ensured that hard-earned foreign currencies were used for importing vital machinery and industrial inputs. The Korean government heavily controlled foreign investment as well, welcoming it with open arms in certain sectors while shutting it out completely in others, according to the evolving national development plan …

    The popular impression of Korea as a free-trade economy was created by its export success. But export success does not require free trade, as Japan and China have also shown. Korean exports in the earlier period – things like simple garments and cheap electronics — were all means to earn the hard currencies needed to pay for the advanced technologies and expensive machines that were necessary for the new, more difficult industries, which were protected through tariffs and subsidies. At the same time, tariff protection and subsidies were not there to shield industries from international competition forever, but to give them the time to absorb new technologies and establish new organizational capabilities until they could compete in the world market.

    The Korean economic miracle was the result of a clever and pragmatic mixture of market incentives and state direction.
    »

    The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism – Ha-Joon Chang

    Ver como o texto é aplicável ao resto da Ásia é um exercício para o leitor.

    Gostar

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